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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
FRANK L. NICOLAI,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45945
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2004-1698B

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Frank Nicolai appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to correct an
illegal sentence. Mr. Nicolai contends the district court erred when it denied his Motion to
Correct An Illegal Sentence because the district court had lost jurisdiction to convict him and
impose the sentence after the statutory time for a speedy trial expired. Mindful of the decision in
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65 (2015) (holding that an illegal sentence is one that is illegal from
the face of the record, does not involve significant questions of fact, and does not require an
evidentiary hearing) and Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110 (2000) (failure to comply with
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limitation period does not result in a jurisdictional defect), Mr. Nicolai asserts that the district
court erred by denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 1986, Mr. Nicolai pled guilty to kidnapping and rape. (R.45945, p.27.) He was
sentenced to twenty-five years for kidnapping and fixed life for rape. (R.45945, p.27; R.35770,
p.24.1) Mr. Nicolai did not appeal from his judgment of conviction. (R.45945, pp.8-9.)
Mr. Nicolai filed his first post-conviction petition in 2006, Ada County case number CVPC-2006-14815, in which he claimed, inter alia, that he did not receive sufficient warnings as
required by Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), prior to speaking with the psychosexual
evaluator. (R.35770, p.125.) Mr. Nicolai prevailed on this issue and he was re-sentenced in
2008 by the same judge to the same sentence. (R.35770, pp.125-128.) An Amended Judgment
of Conviction was filed in 2008, and the other post-conviction claims were dismissed by the trial
court. (R.35770, pp.125-128.)
In 2018, Mr. Nicolai filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. (R.45945,
pp.15-24.) In his motion, Mr. Nicolai asserted that the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction during sentencing and thus, the sentence imposed was illegal. (R.45945, pp.15-16,
18.) Mr. Nicolai asserted that the statutory time period within which he was to be tried expired,
but the district court never ruled as to whether the prosecution had shown good cause; thus, the
district court was required to dismiss the indictment or the prosecution.
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(R.45945, p.16.)

The Idaho Supreme Court, on May 21, 2018, ordered the record in this case to be augmented
with the Clerk’s Record in prior appeal No. 41566. (R.45945, p.2.) However, prior appeal No.
41566 also contained a limited clerk’s record and refers back to prior appeal No. 35770.
Mr. Nicholai has filed a motion requesting this Court take judicial notice of the Clerk’s Record
filed in prior appeal No. 35770.
2

Mr. Nicolai asserted that he never waived his right to a speedy trial, and the State never
mentioned “good cause.” (R.45945, pp.16-17.) As such, the district court lost jurisdiction when
the time for a speedy trial was over, on June 22, 2005, and the court should dismiss the case.
(R.45945, pp.16, 19.)
The district court denied Mr. Nicolai’s motion, ruling:
Defendant’s request is ultimately another attempt at post-conviction relief. He
previously filed post-conviction action(s). These claims could have been raised in
those proceedings. To the extend they were not, he has waived those claims. To
the extent they were, it is res judicata.
...
Defendant’s sentence is not illegal from the face of the record, nor is there new
evidence tending to show that the sentence was excessive.
(R.45945, pp.28-29.)2
Mr. Nicolai promptly moved the district court to reconsider its denial. (R.45945, pp.3137.) The district court denied the motion to reconsider without a hearing. 3 (R.45945, pp.41-42.)
Mr. Nicolai timely appealed from the order denying his I.C.R. 35(a) motion and his motion to
reconsider. (R.45945, pp.50-54.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nicolai’s Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence?
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In the same order, the district court denied Mr. Nicolai’s motion for a hearing on the Rule 35
motion. (R. 45945, pp.26-27.)
3
The district court also denied Mr. Nicolai’s motion for the appointment of counsel. (R. 45945,
p.41.)
3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nicolai’s Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence

A.

Introduction
Mr. Nicolai asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request to correct an

illegal sentence. Mindful of the decision in State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65 (2015) (holding that
an illegal sentence is one that is illegal from the face of the record, does not involve significant
questions of fact, and does not require an evidentiary hearing) and Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107,
110 (2000) (failure to comply with limitation period does not result in a jurisdictional defect),
Mr. Nicolai asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to correct an illegal
sentence.
Mr. Nicolai respectfully requests that this Court order his case to be dismissed as the
district court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is a question

of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004). The issue of
whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case can be raised at any time.
Id. at 758; see State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 838-39 (2011) (holding that the court properly had
jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in which he claimed that
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the charges filed against the
defendant when the grand jury that indicted him was acting without legal authority).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nicolai’s Motion To Correct An Illegal
Sentence
Mr. Nicolai asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal

sentence where the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a conviction after the time for
speedy trial concluded, because it made no finding that the State had shown “good cause” for the
delay, as required by I.C. § 19-3501.
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) permits a district court to correct an illegal sentence at any
time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009). “[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ under I.C.R. 35
is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not
involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 86. Generally,
whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion is a question of law, over which
an appellate court exercises free review. Id. at 84.
The entry of a valid guilty plea ordinarily waives all non-jurisdictional defects. State v.
Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39 (1997). “[J]udgments and orders made without subject matter
jurisdiction are void and ‘are subject to collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in
other states under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.’” State v.
Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011) (quoting Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27
(1978)); see also State v. Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 695 (1967); U.S. Catholic Conference v.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 77 (1988) (holding “[t]he distinction between
subject-matter jurisdiction and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal metaphysics. It
rests instead on the central principle of a free society that courts have finite bounds of authority,
some of constitutional origin, which exist to protect citizens from the very wrong asserted here,
the excessive use of judicial power. The courts, no less than the political branches of the
government, must respect the limits of their authority.”); State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808, 810
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(Ct. App. 2010); State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho 30, 31-32 (2005) (holding that upon expiration of the
statutorily authorized time period, the court loses jurisdiction to place the prisoner on probation).
In Lute, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the court properly had jurisdiction to consider
the defendant’s I.C.R. 35 motion, even though it was filed nearly fifteen years after he was
indicted for the offenses. 150 Idaho at 838-39. The Court found that in cases where it is
apparent that there is an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has the authority
to address that issue. Id. 150 Idaho at 840. The Lute Court held that the district court never had
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s case because the grand jury never issued a valid
indictment. Id. at 841. The Court reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s I.C.R. 35
motion for correction of an illegal sentence and remanded the case with instructions to grant the
I.C.R. 35 motion and vacate the conviction. Id.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized
that the “speedy” trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is a “more vague concept than other
procedural rights,” and that what is considered “speedy” will vary from case to case, depending
on the unique facts of each. Id. at 521-30. Thus, the Barker Court adopted an ad hoc approach,
taking into consideration four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay;
(3) the defendant’s assertion(s) of his right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant
owing to the delay. Id. at 530-33. With regard to the balancing of these four factors, the Court
held as follows: “We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Rather, they are
related factors that must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be
relevant.” Id. at 533.
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The Idaho Constitution contains a virtually identical speedy trial guarantee.

IDAHO

CONST. art I § 13. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the same four-factor test
for evaluating speedy trial claims under the Idaho Constitution as the United States Supreme
Court has applied for evaluating speedy trial claims under the United States Constitution.
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117 (2001).
Under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay, for speedy trial purposes, is measured
from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. See
State v. Risdon, 154 Idaho 244 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding a fifteen month delay is long enough to
be presumptively prejudicial and, therefore, triggered an inquiry into whether it violated the
defendant's constitutional speedy trial right).
Idaho Code § 19-106 also guarantees to every criminal defendant in Idaho the right “[t]o
a speedy and public trial,” although it does not define “speedy.” Nevertheless, Idaho Code
elsewhere provides as follows:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution
or indictment to be dismissed in the following cases:
...
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not
brought to trial within six (6) months from the date the information is filed with
the court.
I.C. § 19-3501. This statutory provision “supplements” the above-referenced Constitutional
guarantees of a “speedy” trial, and has been interpreted to give “additional protection beyond
what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions.” State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,
257-58 (2000). Under § 19-3501, the government is required to demonstrate “good cause” in
order to have the defendant’s trial continued beyond six months. The showing of “good cause”
is evaluated in terms of the “reason for the delay,” as that language was used in Barker. Clark,
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135 Idaho at 260. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “good cause means that there is a
substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay.” Id.
In his motion to correct an illegal sentence, Mr. Nicolai asserted that the district court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction during sentencing and thus, the sentence imposed was illegal.
(R.45945, pp.15-16, 18.) Mr. Nicolai asserted that the statutory time period within which he was
to be tried had expired where Idaho Code § 19-3501 required him to be brought to trial within six
months, but the deadline passed five days before his trial began. (R.45945, p.16.) At a pre-trial
hearing, the issue of speedy trial was brought to the attention of the district court, but the court
did not rule as to whether the prosecution had shown good cause such that the case need not be
dismissed. (R.35770, pp.60-61.) Thereafter, on the second day of trial, Mr. Nicolai pled guilty.
(R.35770, pp.64-70.) However, Mr. Nicolai never waived his right to a speedy trial, and the
State never mentioned “good cause.” (R.45945, pp.16-17.) As such, he asserts that the district
court lost jurisdiction when the time for a speedy trial was over, on June 22, 2005, and the court
should have dismissed the case. (R.45945, pp.16, 19.)
Mindful of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions in Wolfe and Cole, nonetheless,
Mr. Nicolai requests that this Court find that the district court was without subject matter
jurisdiction after the time for speedy trial ran, absent any finding of good cause. Mr. Nicolai
asks this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35(a) motion for correction of an
illegal sentence and remand the case with instructions to grant his motion and vacate his
conviction.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Nicolai respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of his
I.C.R. 35(a) motion for correction of an illegal sentence and remand the case with instructions
to the district court to grant the I.C.R. 35(a) motion and vacate the conviction.
DATED this 28th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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